Bitcoin Quantum Risk Rises as 7.12M BTC Have Visible Public Keys
Bitcoin holdings with visible public keys now total 7.12 million $BTC, according to Glassnode. The figure covers 35.4% of the network’s total issued supply. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could eventually use those keys to target the coins.
35.4% of all #$BTC (7.12M) has a visible public key, the part a future quantum computer could target.
25.8% of supply is exposed due to address reuse, 11.6% on exchanges. Moving those coins to a fresh address ends this exposure.
Charts now live in Studio: https://t.co/jN0cPT4I84 pic.twitter.com/tAJd8jUOUU
— glassnode (@glassnode) November 10, 2026
An earlier Glassnode snapshot put exposed Bitcoin at 6.04 million $BTC, or 30.2% of supply, on May 20. That comparison shows a rise of 1.08 million $BTC and 5.2 percentage points.
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Address Reuse Drives Most Bitcoin Exposure
Address reuse exposes 25.8% of Bitcoin’s issued supply, including 11.6% held on exchanges. Exchange holdings form part of the broader address reuse figure, so adding the two percentages would result in double counting.
Calculations using those figures put reuse at nearly 73% of all exposed coins. Exchanges account for roughly 45% of that portion. According to Glassnode, moving affected coins to fresh addresses removes exposure caused by reuse.
What the $BTC Exposure Figures Measure
Researchers distinguish structural exposure from operational exposure. Early pay-to-public-key and Taproot outputs reveal keys by design. May’s analysis counted 1.92 million $BTC in this structural group.
Wallet behavior creates operational exposure when a transaction reveals a key controlling unspent coins. Reusing the address can leave remaining coins or later deposits linked to that visible key.
Glassnode tracks unspent Bitcoin linked to public keys already visible on the blockchain. Shor’s algorithm could let a sufficiently powerful quantum computer recover the corresponding private keys. Its findings establish neither private-key theft nor a timeline for practical quantum attacks.